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Abstract: This paper reports the results of 15 experimental asset markets designed to investigate the
effect of optimistic forecast bias on market behavior. Each market is organized as a double oral auction
in which participants trade a single-period asset with uncertain value. Traders are informed of the asset
value distribution and, prior to trading, given the opportunity to acquire a forecast of the asset’s period-
end value. The degree of forecast bias is manipulated across experimental sessions so that in some
sessions the forecast contains a systematic, upward (low or high) bias. We conduct sessions with
inexperienced and experienced traders. The results suggest that market prices are supportive of a full
revelation unbiased price in the unbiased markets and the experienced, low-bias markets. The results
from the low-bias markets indicate that as long as traders have sufficient experience with such forecasts,
asset prices reflect the debiased forecasts. In contrast, we find no evidence that high-bias forecasts are
reflected in market prices, regardless of experience. We also find that the demand for forecasted
information persists over time, but it is greater in the unbiased and low-bias conditions than in the high-
bias condition. Finally, we provide little evidence that the net profit (that is, net of the information cost)
of informed and uninformed traders differs, regardless of bias condition or experience level.
JEL classification: C92, D82
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1. Introduction
This paper reports the results of a series of experimental asset markets designed to
investigate the effect of optimistic forecast bias on market behavior.  Although empirical evidence
suggests that analysts’ earnings forecasts have information content and are valued by market
participants (Lys and Sohn [1990] and Stickel [1991]), many archival studies document that such
forecasts are biased upward (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler [1990], Abarbanell [1991], and Ali, Klein,
and Rosenfeld [1992]).  For example, published reports put analysts’ estimates of earnings growth
for the S&P 500 in 1999 at 19 percent, as compared to market strategists’ and economists’
estimates of 4.1 percent (Browning, Ip, and Scism [November 24, 1998, p. A10:1] and New York
Tines [November 25, 1998, p. C7:3]).  The popular press suggests that analysts routinely play up
good news and sugarcoat bad news (Laderman [1998, p. 150]).
Academic research suggests that analysts have incentives to issue optimistic forecasts
(Schipper [1991], Francis and Philbrick [1993], and Lin and McNichols [1998]) or withhold
pessimistic ones (McNichols and O=Brien [1997]).  Dugar and Nathan (1995) and Lin and
McNichols (1998) find that analysts whose firms have underwriting relationships issue more
favorable recommendations than unaffiliated analysts.  While the importance of such incentives is
recognized, the effect of optimistic bias on market behavior is not well understood.   For example,
Lin and McNichols find a significant market reaction to affiliated and unaffiliated
analysts’ reports while Dugar and Nathan find no stock price response to affiliated analysts’
reports.2
Prior research has also examined the effect of optimistic bias on behavior in judgment and
decision-making tasks.  Hirst, Koonce, and Simko (1995) find that investors are cognizant of
analysts’ differential incentives; however, such knowledge does not necessarily affect their
assessments of stock performance.  Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1997a) report that individuals
recognize the usefulness of forecasts with a small upward bias and learn to adjust for the bias.  By
comparison, individuals have much more difficulty with forecasts that reflect a large bias because
the information is not perceived to be useful.  Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1996) offer additional
evidence that the perceived usefulness of information affects individuals’ performance in judgment
tasks.  The current study extends this line of experimental research.  We provide a controlled
examination of the effect of optimistic bias on behavior in a market setting.
Briefly, we conduct 15 experimental markets, each organized as a double oral auction, in
which participants trade a single-period asset with uncertain value.  Traders are informed of the
asset value distribution and given the opportunity to acquire a forecast of the asset’s period-end
value prior to trading.  The degree of forecast bias is manipulated across experimental sessions so
that in some sessions the forecast contains a systematic, upward (low or high) bias.  We conduct
sessions with inexperienced and experienced traders because prior findings suggest that traders’
participation in an earlier market with identical features can affect observed behavior (e.g.,
Forsythe and Lundholm [1990] and Ackert and Church [1998a]).  We recognize that biased
forecasts may introduce additional complexities in a market setting and that experience may be
necessary in order for behavior to settle down.
Several benefits arise from the use of an experimental approach. We are able to carefully
regulate the degree of forecast bias, flow of information to the market, and fundamental3
determinants of asset value.  These aspects create the potential for confounds and are difficult to
control in studies using archival data.  Our primary objective is to examine the effect of forecast
bias on price dynamics in a market setting.  The crucial question is how individual behavior
translates into market behavior.  To shed insight into price dynamics we also investigate forecast
acquisition decisions and the distribution of profit across informed and uninformed traders.  We
investigate whether prices reflect adjustment for bias (the debiased forecast) and the efficient
dissemination of information available to market participants.  Although previous experimental
research has examined market behavior in the presence of private information, these studies have
not explored instances in which private information contains a systematic, upward bias.
1  The
current study provides an opportunity to examine the effect of such a bias on market outcomes.
Our results suggest that market prices support the full revelation unbiased price in the
unbiased markets.  In addition, asset prices reflect adjusted low bias forecasts as long as traders
have sufficient experience with such forecasts.  Private information is disseminated in these
markets and prices reflect the debiased forecast.  In contrast, we do not find any evidence that
high bias forecasts are reflected in market prices, regardless of experience.  We also find that the
demand for forecasted information persists over time, but demand is greater in the unbiased and
low bias conditions than the high bias condition.  The forecast acquisition data suggest that
traders in the high bias condition have more difficulty recognizing the usefulness of forecasts than
those in the low bias condition.  Finally, we provide little evidence of differences in the profit, net
of information cost, of informed and uninformed traders, regardless of bias condition or
experience level.4
The framework for the study is provided in section 2.  The experimental procedures are
described in section 3 with the results presented in section 4.  The final section provides a
summary and concluding remarks.
2. Framework
We examine three forecast bias conditions: forecasts are unbiased, forecasts contain low
systematic upward bias, and forecasts contain high systematic upward bias.  In the unbiased
condition, the forecast is equal to the asset value plus a small, mean zero stochastic error term.  In
the two bias conditions, the forecast is equal to the unbiased forecast plus a positive constant.  In
addition, we investigate whether experience in an earlier market affects behavior.  For each
market set we investigate (1) observed asset prices,  (2) the frequency of forecast acquisition, and
(3) the profit of informed versus uninformed traders.
If market prices reflect all available information and market participants are able to use the
information contained in the forecast, prices should converge to the forecast less the constant,
systematic bias.  We refer to the benchmark in this case as the full revelation unbiased price (FR
U).
 Alternatively, private information may not be disseminated and prices may converge to the mean
of the asset value distribution.  This case is referred to as the no revelation price (NR).
Experimental markets studies indicate that under various conditions private information
about asset value is fully revealed in transaction prices (Plott and Sunder [1982], Banks [1985],
and Sunder [1992]).  In our study private information provides a useful signal of asset value, but
is not perfect.  The extent to which market prices reflect private information is affected
fundamentally by informed agents’ abilities to decipher the relationship between forecasts and5
asset value.  Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1997a) report that individuals are able to effectively
use unbiased and low bias forecasts, but encounter difficulties assessing a high bias.  Hence, we
expect to observe convergence to FR
U in the unbiased and low bias conditions and NR in the high
bias condition.
The full revelation price prediction assumes that forecasted information is demanded.  In
our markets, participants are given the opportunity to purchase a forecast of the asset’s value
each period at a fixed price.  Theoretically if asset prices fully reveal information, the number of
traders who acquire the forecast should converge to zero.  But zero forecast acquisitions is not an
equilibrium because when no one acquires the information, every trader has the incentive to
purchase the forecast. 
Sunder (1992) finds that perfect information is demanded across a variety of conditions in
a market setting.  Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1997b) find similar results with imperfect
information.  Both studies document that demand for information fluctuates, sometimes widely,
and shows no evidence of convergence to zero.  Other research on individual behavior indicates
that participants perceive that forecasted information is useful, even when the information
contains optimistic bias (Ackert, Church, and Shehata [1996]).  However the magnitude of the
bias may affect information acquisition decisions.  Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1997a) report
that a majority of participants acquire unbiased and low bias forecasts on a continuing basis,
whereas the demand for high bias forecasts is significantly less.  Given the prior results, we expect
that forecasted information will be acquired and that the number of traders acquiring the forecast
will not converge to zero over time, regardless of the degree of forecast bias.  Based on the
findings of Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1997a), we also investigate whether forecast bias affects6
the frequency of forecast acquisition: that is, whether traders in the high bias condition acquire
forecasts less frequently than those in the unbiased and low bias conditions.
Traders may acquire forecasted information over time as along as they believe that, at a
minimum, the cost of the forecast can be recovered.  Price variation, particularly early in a trading
period, may allow informed traders to recover the cost of the forecast.  Sunder (1992) finds that
prices fail to instantaneously reflect private information so that the net profit of informed traders 
(i.e., earnings less information cost) is not significantly different from that of the uninformed. 
Under FR
U, informed traders are expected to effectively use forecasted information and recover
the cost of such information.
2  Hence, we do not expect the net profit of informed and uninformed
traders to differ in the unbiased and low bias conditions.  The expectation differs in the high bias
condition, in which case informed agents are expected to have difficulty assessing the bias.  They
may be unable to effectively use forecasted information and, as a consequence, may not recover
the cost of the information.  We examine whether the net profit of informed traders is less than
that of the uninformed in the high bias condition.
3. Experimental Method
3.1 DESIGN
Fifteen experimental asset markets are conducted.  We vary the degree of forecast bias
across sessions.  In markets 1-3 and 1x-2x, the forecast is an unbiased estimate of asset value (i.e.,
the period-end dividend).  In markets 4-9 and 3x-6x, the forecast contains a systematic, upward
bias.  The relative magnitude of the bias is low in markets 4-6 and 3x-4x and high in markets 7-9
and 5x-6x.  Participants are inexperienced in markets 1-9 and experienced in markets 1x-6x,7
where experienced traders have taken part in an earlier market under the same forecast bias
condition.  The experimental design is summarized in table 1.
3.2 PROCEDURES
At the beginning of each session, participants receive a set of instructions that is read
aloud by an experimenter.  Each market has eight traders, who are recruited from third- and
fourth-year undergraduate and fifth-year post baccalaureate students at a medium-sized university.
 Substantially all of the participants are students in business or economics.
3  Students earn from
$16.44 to $33.49, with an average of $26.05, for participating approximately 120 minutes.
Each market consists of 12 periods during which participants trade certificates with one-
period lives.  A dividend is received for each certificate held at period end.  Participants are
instructed that the period-end dividend is determined by drawing from a normal distribution with a
mean of $1,200 and a standard deviation of $400.
4  The instructions include a diagram of the
density function and state that the dividend is between $800 and $1,600 with a probability of
0.6826, between $600 and $1,800 with a probability of 0.8664, and between $400 and $2,000
with a probability of 0.9544.  Further, we note that practically speaking, the dividend is always
nonnegative.
Each period participants are endowed with two certificates and $50,000.  Participants are
informed that they may pay a tax on their dividend earnings, where their tax rate can be either
zero or 40 percent.  The instructions indicate that the tax rates differ across traders and between
periods.  Each period half of the participants are randomly assigned each tax rate, with the8
constraint that each participant is assigned each rate the same number of times.  The different tax
rates introduce different preferences for dividend earnings and create incentives to trade.
Prior to the commencement of trading, participants are allowed to purchase a forecast of
the period-end asset value at a fixed price of $100.  Participants are not, however, provided with
any information about the accuracy of the forecast.  In the unbiased condition, the forecast is
computed as the asset value plus a mean zero, random error term, which is determined by drawing
from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of $30.  In the low (high) bias condition, the
forecast is computed as the unbiased forecast plus a constant of $200 ($400).  The unbiased
forecast and asset values per period are randomly determined prior to the markets and the same
values are used across markets.
5  The preselected values are shown in table 2.
Each period traders are free to make verbal offers to buy or sell one certificate at a
designated price and all offers are publicly announced and recorded.  Outstanding offers stand
until accepted or replaced by a better bid or ask price.  All periods last four minutes and
participants are not informed beforehand of the number of periods.
At the end of each period, the value of the dividend is publicly announced and the same
dividend is received for all certificates held by a participant.  Period-end cash balances are
computed as follows.  The number of certificates on hand is multiplied by the dividend per
certificate to determine dividend earnings.  This amount is converted to an after-tax figure by
multiplying by one minus the tax rate.  Participants add the after-tax dividend earnings to their
cash balance and then subtract the initial endowment of $50,000.  The net amount represents
participants’ profits for the period.  Endowments are reinitialized at the beginning of the
subsequent period.9
At the conclusion of each session, participants are paid 0.001 of their experimental profits
in cash and a post-experiment questionnaire is administered.  The questionnaire is designed to




For each market we investigate whether asset prices converge to the FR
U or NR
benchmark.  We plot the last transaction price per period along with the relevant benchmark
prices.  The focus is on the last price per period because earlier transactions are informative.
7  
The price plots of six markets are presented in figures 1-6.  The markets selected are
representative of the different experimental conditions:  two markets from each forecast bias
condition, with one consisting of inexperienced traders and the other experienced traders.  The
figures also include the number of forecast acquisitions per period, which is discussed later.
We investigate whether asset prices converge to FR
U in the unbiased and low bias
conditions and NR in the high bias condition.  An inspection of the price plots suggests that in the
unbiased group, asset prices closely track FR
U, particularly when traders are experienced (refer to
figures 1-2).  In the low bias group, a similar pattern emerges, although the difference between the
inexperienced and experienced markets is more pronounced: the markets with experienced traders
more closely follow FR
U (refer to figures 3-4).  In the high bias group, asset prices do not seem to
deviate too much from NR (refer to figures 5-6).
For each market, we count the number of times that the last price per period is closer to
FR
U or NR.
8  A summary of the counts by experimental condition is shown table 3.  For the10
unbiased and low bias markets, we conduct binomial tests to assess whether the proportion of
times that the last price is closer to FR
U is greater than a chance occurrence of 50 percent.  We
focus on the FR
U proportion because in these markets prices are expected to converge to FR
U. 
As shown in table 3, all four comparisons are statistically significant at p < 0.005 (one-tailed
tests).  Further, the z-statistics are larger for markets with experienced traders, which suggests
that experience reinforces a convergence to FR
U.  For the high bias markets, we test whether the
proportion of times that the last price is closer to NR is greater than 50 percent.  The focus is on
the NR proportion because in these markets prices are expected to converge to NR.  When
traders are inexperienced (experienced), the difference is statistically significant at p = 0.004 (p =
0.052).  Overall, the findings are consistent with our a priori expectations.
Next, we perform an analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) to formally assess the effects of
forecast bias and experience on asset price behavior.  In order to perform a parsimonious analysis,
we examine deviations in price from FR
U.  The dependent variable is the absolute value of the
difference between the last price per period and FR
U normalized by FR
U.   Although not reported,
inferences are unaffected if we examine deviations in price from NR.
 The ANOVA results, shown in panel A of table 4, indicate that both main effects are
significant at p < 0.015 and that the interaction effect is significant at p = 0.062.
9  The cell means,
presented in panel B of table 4, indicate that price deviations increase as forecast bias increases
and decrease with experience.  Additional analysis, however, is necessary because of the
marginally significant interaction term.  To gain insight into the ANOVA results, we examine the
simple effects of forecast bias and experience on price behavior.  We find that the price deviations
of the unbiased and high bias groups are significantly different at p < 0.001 (Tukey HSD pairwise11
tests), regardless of experience level.  The placement of the low bias group, on the other hand,
hinges on experience.  This group is significantly different from the unbiased group (p = 0.027),
but not the high bias group (p = 0.118), when traders are inexperienced.  Conversely, the low bias
group is significantly different from the high bias group (p < 0.001), but not the unbiased group (p
= 0.984) when traders are experienced.  Subsequent analysis reveals that experience reduces price
deviations in the unbiased and low bias groups (p < 0.05), but not the high bias group (p = 0.906).
 Overall, the deviations in price from FR
U are relatively small in the unbiased markets and in the
experienced, low bias markets.  By comparison, the deviations are much larger (three times larger
at a minimum) in the high bias markets.
4.2 FORECAST ACQUISITIONS
We examine the frequency of forecast acquisitions per period and assess whether there are
differences across groups.  For each experimental condition, the mean and standard deviation of
the number of acquisitions per period, computed over periods 1-6, 7-12, and 1-12, are shown in
table 5.  Approximately six of eight traders (or 75 percent) acquire forecasts in the unbiased and
low bias conditions.  In contrast, only about four of eight (or 50 percent) acquire forecasts in the
high bias condition.  The frequency of forecast acquisitions does not appear to be affected by
experience nor does it appear to differ across periods 1-6 and 7-12.  Inspection of the data
indicates that across the 15 markets forecast acquisitions range from two to eight per period and
never converge to zero.  This finding is consistent with Sunder (1992) and Ackert, Church, and
Shehata (1997b) and provides evidence that forecasted information is demanded in a market
setting even if it contains an optimistic bias.  Further inspection of the data (refer to figures 1-6)12
indicates that the number of acquisitions per period typically ranges from five to seven in the
unbiased and low bias groups and three to five in the high bias group.  Moreover, no discernible
pattern in the frequency of forecast acquisitions is apparent over time.
We perform an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to formally assess the effects of forecast
bias and experience on the frequency of forecast acquisition.  The dependent variable is the
proportion of times that each trader acquires the forecast over periods 1-12.
10  The ANOVA
results, shown in panel A of table 6, indicate that forecast bias is statistically significant at p =
0.003.  The mean proportion of acquisitions, shown in panel B of table 6, is 0.773, 0.767, and
0.542 in the unbiased, low bias, and high bias groups, respectively.  Tukey HSD pairwise tests
indicate that the unbiased and low bias groups are significantly different from the high bias group
at p < 0.01.  This finding is consistent with Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1997a) and suggests
that, in a market setting, participants are less willing to acquire high bias forecasts than unbiased
or low bias forecasts.  Overall, the forecast acquisition results are consistent with a priori
expectations.
To gain additional insight into participants’ forecast acquisition decisions, we investigate
their responses to the post-experiment questionnaire, which includes the following: if you
acquired the forecast at all during the experiment, what affected your decision to continue or stop
acquiring the information?  Participants’ responses and corresponding frequencies are summarized
in table 7.  The most commonly listed factor is that the forecast provides a range or guide to
determine trading behavior.  Tax rates are the next most frequently listed factor.  Subsequent
investigation indicates that forecasts are acquired more often when a trader’s tax rate (on dividend
earnings) is zero as opposed to 40 percent (c
2 = 44.74, p < 0.001).
11  Participants may perceive13
that forecasted information is less useful when their tax rate is 40 percent because, for the most
part, they are only interested in selling certificates: transaction prices must be at least 40 percent
below the asset’s period-end value for them to benefit from buying certificates.  When participants
have a tax rate of zero, on the other hand, they may benefit from buying or selling certificates.  By
acquiring the forecast, participants can refine their expectation of the asset’s period-end value,
which helps them determine whether to buy or sell certificates.
One other factor is listed frequently as underlying participants’ forecast acquisition
decisions:  the perceived accuracy of the forecast.  A closer examination of participants’ responses
reveals a fundamental difference across the forecast bias groups.  Those in the unbiased and low
bias groups indicate that the forecast is accurate, whereas those in the high bias group indicate
that it is not accurate and, thus, of little use.  This finding is consistent with Ackert, Church, and
Shehata (1997a) and reinforces our earlier results (refer to table 6).
4.3 TRADING PROFIT
Trading profit may be affected by participants’ forecast acquisition decisions, pricing
efficiencies, and allocational efficiencies.  Initially we examine allocational efficiencies to assess
the proportion of assets held at period end by traders with a zero tax rate.  In the absence of
mispricing, all certificates should be held by those who are not taxed on dividend earnings.  For
each experimental condition, the mean proportion of assets held by these traders, computed over
periods 1-6, 7-12, and 1-12, is shown in table 8.  Across the different experimental groups, the
mean proportion ranges from 73.21 percent to 97.59 percent.  The allocational efficiencies are
high and similar to those reported elsewhere (e.g., Sunder [1992]).  Further examination of the14
data suggests that allocational efficiencies improve as time progresses and with experience.  We
perform an ANOVA to formally test this assertion.  The dependent measure is the proportion of
assets per period held by traders with a zero tax rate.
12  The independent variables include
forecast bias, experience, an interaction term, and a covariate for period.  The ANOVA results
indicate that experience (F = 10.12, p = 0.002) and period (F = 16.73, p < 0.001) are statistically
significant and that the sign of the covariate is positive.  No other variables are significant at any
conventional level.  These findings are consistent with our observations.
13
Next we compare the profit of informed versus uninformed traders.  For each market, we
compute an average net profit per period for informed and uninformed traders.  The computed net
profit is then normalized by the period-end dividend.  The normalization is necessary because
trading profit is directly affected by the magnitude of the dividend which varies across periods. 
The difference between the normalized net profit of informed and uninformed traders is computed
using data from periods 1-6, 7-12, and 1-12.  The resulting means by experimental condition are
shown in table 9.
We test whether the normalized net profit of informed traders is equal to (less than) that of
the uninformed in the unbiased and low bias (high bias) groups.  We perform parametric, paired t-
tests and nonparametric, Wilcoxon signed ranks tests using data from periods 1-12.  For the
unbiased and low bias groups, seven of eight test statistics are not significant at conventional
levels (refer to table 9).  The net profit of informed traders, in general, is not significantly different
from that of uninformed traders.  This result is consistent with a priori expectations.  For the high
bias group, two of four test statistics are significant at p < 0.07 (refer to table 9).  With
experienced (inexperienced) traders, the net profit of the informed is significantly less than (not15
significantly different from) that of the uninformed.  These findings are partially consistent with a
priori expectations.
5. Concluding Remarks
This study reports the results of 15 experimental asset markets.  We find that market
prices reflect unbiased forecasts and, once traders have sufficient experience, low bias forecasts. 
In the unbiased and experienced, low bias markets, observed prices are supportive of a full
revelation unbiased price.  In contrast, we do not find any evidence that asset prices reflect high
bias forecasts, regardless of experience.  The forecast acquisition data indicate that traders acquire
unbiased and low bias forecasts more frequently than high bias forecasts and that traders have
greater difficulty using high bias forecasts.  Our results, taken together with those of Ackert,
Church, and Shehata (1997a), suggest that individual behavior can translate into market behavior
(see also Ganguly, Kagel, and Moser [1994]).  Notably, the difficulties that individuals have with
high bias forecasts do not appear to be mitigated in a market setting. 
Our results have implications for research that has examined the use of analysts’ forecasts
as a proxy for market expectations.  Previous studies have documented an optimistic bias (e.g.,
Francis and Philbrick [1993] and Dugar and Nathan [1995]).  Our findings suggest that market
prices adjust for low bias forecasts and fail to reflect high bias forecasts.  Hence, the use of
unadjusted forecasts as a proxy for market expectations may not be appropriate.
Our results also indicate that the demand for high bias forecasts persists over time,
although such forecasts are acquired less frequently than unbiased and low bias forecasts.  The
finding is curious because informed traders are not always able to recover the cost of high bias16
forecasts.  We speculate that once traders have extensive experience, the demand for such
forecasts may diminish.  This issue is left for future research.  Another issue that our study does
not address is the market value of biased forecasts.  Sunder (1992) and Ackert, Church, and
Shehata (1997b) find that the price of perfect and imperfect information, respectively, falls over
time and approaches zero.  Future studies may examine whether similar results are obtained with
low and high bias forecasts.17
ENDNOTES
1. Prior studies have examined private information that is perfect, imperfect, and incomplete. 
Perfect information reveals an asset’s period-end value with certainty (e.g., Plott and Sunder
[1982], Banks [1985], and Sunder [1992]), whereas imperfect information reveals value with a
known probability (Ackert, Church, and Shehata [1997b]).  Incomplete information allows traders
to reduce the number of possible outcome values (e.g., Plott and Sunder [1988], Forsythe and
Lundholm [1990], Ackert and Church [1998b]).
2. Informed traders are not expected to generate greater net profit than the uninformed because,
under such conditions, everyone would have an incentive to acquire the forecast.
3. Markets 1, 7, 8, and 5x each included one participant who was not majoring in business or
economics.
4. The dividend draw is rounded to the nearest dollar and all trading is in dollars.
5. Cason and Friedman (1996) discuss the benefits of using a preselected sequence.
6. Participants’ responses to the questionnaire suggest that they found the experiment interesting
and the monetary incentives motivating.  Participants were asked to respond on a seven-point
scale as to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1=not very interesting and 7=very
interesting.  The mean response was 5.99.  Participants also responded on a seven-point scale as
to how they would characterize the money earned for taking part in the experiment, where
1=nominal amount and 7=considerable amount.  The mean response was 5.41.
7. Although not reported, we also examine the average of the last three prices and find that
inferences are not affected.
8. The FR
U price predictions assume that two or more traders with a zero tax rate acquire the
forecast in a particular period.  Across the 15 markets, this requirement is satisfied in 174 of 180
periods (96.67 percent).  The requirement is violated twice in market 7, once in market 8, and
three times in market 9.  All analyses are repeated excluding these periods and inferences are
unaffected.  We are indebted to Larry Wall for bringing this point to our attention.
9. We also included the number of forecast acquisitions as a covariate and repeated the analysis.
Inferences are unaffected.  The sign of the covariate is negative and statistically significant with t
= -2.234, p = 0.027.
10. Press (1972) warns that heteroskedasticity may be a problem when the dependent variable is a
proportion.  He recommends an arcsine, square-root transformation to circumvent the problem. 
We repeat the analysis applying this transformation to the dependent variable and find that
inferences are unaffected.  In addition, we repeat the analysis restricting the data to periods 1-6
and 7-12 and find that inferences are unaffected.
11. We find that traders acquire forecasts 558 of 720 times (77.50 percent) when their tax rate is
zero and 441 of 720 time (61.25 percent) when their tax rate is 40 percent.  Further differences in
the relative proportions are not apparent across the experimental groups.
12. We repeat the analysis after applying an arcsine, square-root transformation to the dependent
variable and find that inferences are unaffected (refer to note 10).18
13. We also examined whether trading activity differs across experimental conditions.  We
perform an ANOVA in which the dependent measure is the number of transactions per period. 
The independent variables include forecast bias, experience, and an interaction term.  Although
not reported, none of the independent variables are statistically significant at any conventional
level.19
REFERENCES
Abarbanell, J.S. “Do Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Incorporate Information in Prior Stock Price
Changes?” Journal of Accounting and Economics 14 (June 1991): 147-65.
Ackert, L.F.; and B.K. Church. “The Effects of Subject Pool and Design Experience on
Rationality in Experimental Asset Markets.” Working paper, number 98-18, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta and Georgia Tech, 1998a.
Ackert, L.F.; and B.K. Church. “Information Dissemination and the Distribution of Wealth:
Evidence From Experimental Asset Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 37 (November 1998b): 357-371.
Ackert, L.F.; B.K. Church, and M. Shehata. “What Affects Individuals’ Decisions to Acquire
Forecasted Information?” Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (Fall 1996): 379-399.
Ackert, L.F.; B.K. Church; and M. Shehata. “An Experimental Examination of the Effects of
Forecast Bias on Individuals’ Use of Forecasted Information.” Journal of Accounting
Research 35 (Spring 1997a): 25-42.
Ackert, L.F.; B.K. Church; and M. Shehata. “Market Behavior in the Presence of Costly,
Imperfect Information: Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 33 (May 1997b): 61-74.
Ali, A.; A. Klein; and J. Rosenfeld. “Analysts’ Use of Information About Permanent and
Transitory Earnings Components in Forecasting Annual EPS” The Accounting Review 67
(January 1992): 183-98.
Banks, J.S. “Price-Conveyed Information Versus Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational
Expectations Convergence.” Journal of Political Economy 93 (August 1985): 807-15.
Browning, E.S., G. Ip, and L. Scism. “What Correction? With Dazzling Speed, Market Roars
Back to Another New High.” Wall Street Journal (November 24, 1998): A1:6, A10:1.
Cason, T.N.; and D. Friedman. “Price Formation in Double Auction Markets.” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 20 (August 1996): 1307-37.
Copeland, T.E., and D. Friedman. “Partial Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset
Markets.” Journal of Finance 46 (March 1991): 265-295.
De Bondt, W.F.M.; and R.H. Thaler. “Do Security Analysts Overreact?” American Economic
Review 80 (May 1990): 52-7.20
Dugar, A.; and S. Nathan. “The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations.” Contemporary
Accounting Research 12 (Fall 1995): 131-60.
Forsythe, R.; and R. Lundholm. “Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market.”
Econometrica 58 (March 1990): 309-47.
Francis, J.; and D. Philbrick. “Analysts’ Decisions as Products of a Multi-Task Environment.”
Journal of Accounting Research 31 (Autumn 1993): 216-30.
Ganguly, A.R.; J.H. Kagel; and D.V. Moser. “The Effects of Biases in Probability Judgments on 
Market Prices.” Accounting, Organizations and Society 19 (November 1994): 675-700.
Hirst, D.E.; L. Koonce; and P.J. Simko. “Investor Reactions to Financial Analysts’ Research
Reports.” Journal of Accounting Research 33 (Autumn 1995): 335-51.
Laderman, J.M. “Wall Street’s Spin Game: Stock Analysts Often Have a Hidden Agenda.”
Business Week (October 5, 1998): 148, 150, 152, 154, and 156.
Lin, H.-w.; and M.F. McNichols. “Underwriting Relationships, Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and
Investor Recommendations.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 25 (February 1998):
101-127
Lys, T.; and S. Sohn. “The Association Between Revisions of Financial Analysts’ Earnings
Forecasts and Security-Price Changes.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 13
(December 1990): 341-63.
McNichols, M.; and P.C. O’Brien. “Self-Selection and Analyst Coverage.” Journal of Accounting
Research 35 (Supplement 1997): 167-99.
New York Times. “The Markets: Stocks and Bonds: Concerns on Profit Outlook Help Deflate he
Dow a Bit.” (November 25, 1998): C7:3.
Plott, C.R.; and S. Sunder. “Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets With Insider
Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models.” Journal of Political
Economy 90 (August 1982): 663-98.
Plott, C.R.; and S. Sunder. “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in
Laboratory Security Markets.” Econometrica 56 (September 1988): 1085-118.
Press, S.J. Applied Multivariate Statistics. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972.
Schipper, K. “Analysts’ Forecasts.” Accounting Horizons 5 (December 1991): 105-21.21
Stickel, S. E. “Common Stock Returns Surrounding Earnings Forecast Revisions: More Puzzling
Evidence.” The Accounting Review 66 (April 1991): 402-16.




Market Forecast Bias Experience
a
1-3 Unbiased Inexperienced
4-6 Low Bias Inexperienced
7-9 High Bias Inexperienced
1x-2x Unbiased Experienced
3x-4x Low Bias Experienced
5x-6x High Bias Experienced
aExperienced traders participated in an earlier market under the same forecast bias condition.23
Table 2
Unbiased Forecast and Period-End Asset Values












1 $1,533 $1,543 $1,650 $1,670
2   1,002   1,030      980      974
3      656      665   1,280   1,290
4      772      777      632      624
5   1,591   1,564      793      768
6   1,965   2,012   1,420   1,390
7   1,544   1,584      814      860
8   1,228   1,264   1,010   1,030
9   1,207   1,145      750      796
10      662      655   1,170   1,190
11      970      963   1,780   1,810
12   1,480   1,478      971      957
aIn markets 4-6 and 3x-4x, the low bias forecast is the unbiased forecast plus $200.  In markets 7-
9 and 5x-6x, the high bias forecast is the unbiased forecast plus $400.  Traders are inexperienced
in markets 1-9 and experienced in markets 1x-6x.24
Table 3
The Frequency With Which the Last Price Per
Period is Consistent With FR
U and NR
Experimental Condition Last Price Per Period is Closer To
a Binomial Test
b
Forecast Bias Experience FR
U NR z-statistic
(p-value)
Inexperienced 26 10 2.67
(0.004) Unbiased
Experienced 21 3 3.67
(0.000)
Inexperienced 27 9 3.00
(0.001) Low Bias
Experienced 23 1 4.49
(0.000)
Inexperienced 10 26 2.67
(0.004) High Bias
Experienced 8 16 1.63
(0.052)
aFR
U is the full revelation unbiased price (i.e., the unbiased forecast) and NR is the no revelation
price (i.e., the mean of the asset value distribution).
bFor each experimental condition, we test whether the relevant proportion is greater than a chance
occurrence of 50 percent.  For the unbiased and low bias markets, we compare the proportion of
times that the last price is closer to FR
U.  For the high bias markets, we compare the proportion of
times that the last price is closer to NR.  The reported p-values are for one-tailed tests.25
Table 4
The Effect of Forecast Bias and Experience on the
Deviations in Price From FR
Ua
Panel A: ANOVA Results
Variable Sum of Squares df F-statistic p-value
Forecast Bias 1.32 2 26.89 0.000
Experience 0.15 1 6.19 0.014
Interaction 0.14 2 2.87 0.062
Error 4.28 174
Panel B: Cell Means
Inexperienced Experienced Total
Unbiased 0.078 0.049 0.065
Low Bias 0.189 0.051 0.133
High Bias 0.273 0.266 0.270
Total 0.180 0.121 0.156
aFR
U is the full revelation unbiased price (i.e., the unbiased forecast).  The dependent measure in





Mean (Standard Deviation) Forecast Acquisitions
a
Experimental Condition Periods





































aThe cell entries indicate the mean (standard deviation) of the number of forecast acquisitions per
period.27
Table 6
The Effect of Forecast Bias and Experience on the
Frequency of Forecast Acquisition
a
Panel A: ANOVA Results
Variable Sum of Squares df F-statistic p-value
Forecast Bias 96.84 2 6.27 0.003
Experience 4.51 1 0.29 0.590
Interaction 0.09 2 0.01 0.994
Error 15.45 114
Panel B: Cell Means
Inexperienced Experienced Total
Unbiased 0.760 0.792 0.773
Low Bias 0.750 0.792 0.767
High Bias 0.531 0.557 0.542
Total 0.681 0.714 0.694
aThe dependent measure in the ANOVA is the proportion of times that each trader acquires the
forecast over periods 1-12.28
Table 7
Factors that Affect Participants= Forecast Acquisition





1-3 4-6 7-9 1x-2x 3x-4x 5x-6x Total
the forecast provides a range
for trading
11 8 9 6 6 3 43
the tax rate 9 7 8 7 4 4 39
the perceived forecast accuracy 8 7 9 3 4 6 37
the ability to infer the forecast
from the behavior of others
4 6 0 2 2 0 14
other
c 1 1 0 2 2 1 7
aSeveral participants listed more than one factor in their response.  All factors listed are included
in the table.
bForecasts are unbiased in markets 1-3 and 1x-2x, contain a low bias in markets 4-6 and 3x-4x,
and contain a high bias in markets 7-9 and 5x-6x.  Traders are inexperienced in markets 1-9 and
experienced in markets 1x-6x.
cOther factors were incomprehensible or listed by only one participant.29
Table 8
The Proportion of Assets Held at Period-End by
Traders With a Zero Tax Rate
Experimental Condition Periods
Forecast Bias Experience 1-6 7-12 1-12
Inexperienced  73.70 97.59 85.65
Unbiased
Experienced 94.44 96.89 95.67
Inexperienced 73.21 84.75 78.89
Low Bias
Experienced 88.18 94.39 91.29
Inexperienced 79.58 87.02 83.30
High Bias
Experienced 87.23 89.69 88.46
aThe cell entries indicate the mean proportion of assets held by traders with a tax rate of zero,
which provides a measure of allocational efficiencies.30
Table 9
Normalized Net Profit of Informed Over Uninformed Traders
Experimental Condition Periods
a


































aNormalized net profit of informed over uninformed traders is the difference in the net profit of
the two types of traders per period divided by the period-end dividend.  The cell entries indicate
the mean normalized net profit of informed over uninformed traders using data from periods 1-6,
7-12, and 1-12.
bThe t-statistic (p-value) is for a paired test to compare the net profit of informed and uninformed
traders per period using data from periods 1-12.  We test whether the net profit of the informed is
equal to (less than) that of the uninformed for the unbiased and low bias (high bias) groups. 
Accordingly, the p-values are for two-tailed (one-tailed) tests.
cThe z-statistic (p-value) is for a Wilcoxon signed ranks test to compare the net profit of informed
and uninformed traders using data from periods 1-12.  We test whether the net profit of the
informed is equal to (less than) that of the uninformed for the unbiased and low bias (high bias)
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Figure 6